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Abstract
In the last decade, complexity economics has emerged as a powerful approach to the understanding
of the most relevant factors influencing economic development. The concept of economic complexity
has been applied to the study of different economic issues such as economic growth, technological
change and inequality. With this work we aim at extending the application of this concept to the study
of the financial side of the economy, and, in particular, of the macroeconomic effects of rising financial
complexity. In this paper, we present an agent-based model integrating an increasingly complex
financial sector with a real side of the economy populated, among other sectors, by heterogeneous
households. We test the systemic impact that the increasing complexity of both the financial system
and the financial products it manufactures bear on economic growth, macroeconomic stability and
inequality. We find mixed results with respect to the positive economic implications the existing
literature ascribes to products complexity and deepening production capabilities. Despite higher
financial complexity may lead to faster growth, our model suggests that this comes at the cost of
heightened financial fragility, a more crisis-prone economic system, and increasing levels of income
and wealth inequality. According to these findings, and consistently with pioneering insights from
Minsky, we claim that rising complexity does not always entail positive consequences for the well-
being of the economy. This is particularly true when it comes to financial innovations and financial
complexity.
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1 Introduction
Complexity is not a new concept in the economic discipline. This fact notwithstanding, in the last decade
it has been recurrently applied to an expanding variety of fields of analysis adopting different meanings
and pursuing different goals.
At the origin of the story, complexity came to economics as a new methodology for the study of
the evolution of economic system, which could represent an alternative to the standard equilibrium-
and calculus-centered mainstream approach. In this sense, complexity was mainly conceived as system
complexity, i.e., a vision of the economy as a complex set of interactions among heterogeneous agents,
which endogenously determine the environment they live in and to which they constantly react to by
changing, revising and adapting their actions (Arthur et al., 1997; Arthur, 2014).
Since mid of the 2000s, thanks to the theoretical and empirical contributions by Hausmann et al.
(2007), Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), and Felipe et al. (2012), complexity has been also adopted with the
meaning of product, production or, more broadly, economic complexity. In this context, complexity stands
for set of technological knowledge and capabilities, as well as organization and managerial competencies
through which different countries may develop different productive systems and, as a consequence, give
rise to different development trajectories.
After the outbreak of the 2007-2008 worldwide financial crisis, the concepts of system complexity as
well as financial product complexity have been largely applied to the study of modern financial systems
with the purpose of better understanding the origin and development of the financial crisis itself. On the
one hand, economists have started to apply the main pillars of system complexity theory to the study of
financial systems in order to stress how boom-and bust cycles, tipping points, and contagion phenomena
may emanate from the interaction between heterogeneous agents in complex financial networks, as well
as from the positive (hence destabilizing) endogenous feedbacks that such interactions may give rise
(Battiston et al., 2016). On the other hand, an expanding body of literature has put emphasis on the
increasing complexity of some financial products, namely securitized assets such as asset-backed securities
and collateralized debt obligations, as a relevant source of rising riskiness, both at the level of the single
(underlying) asset, as well as of the system as a whole (Furfine, 2012; Ghent et al., 2017).
In this paper, we connect and create a bridge between these three strands of literature by analyzing
the macroeconomic implications of increasing financial complexity. We first run a parallelism between
complexity in the financial system and the more standard notion of product or economic complexity. We
capture financial complexity as both the expanding variety of financial instruments through which the
financial system provides finance to real-side economic activities (i.e., banks’ loans or commercial papers),
and the intrinsic complexity of some financial products (i.e. collateralized securities) manufactured by
financial institutions at the benefit of final investors. We aim at analyzing the effects that rising financial
complexity might bear on the growth performance of the economy, its macroeconomic stability and the
level of inequality characterizing income and wealth distribution. Secondly, accordingly with the system
complexity approach, we carry out our analysis through a complex agent-based (AB) stock-flow-consitent
(SFC) featuring multiple financial sectors and heterogenous households. Consistently with Arthur (2014),
a central feature of our model is the existence of positive feedbacks in the continuous interactions between
heterogeneous households, the productive non-financial sector, and financial institutions giving rise to
endogenous boom-and-bust credit cycles.
The results of our computational model suggest that when complexity meets finance, it may bear
rather different macroeconomic effects with respect to those ascribed to the more standard phenomenon
of product or economic complexity. The existing literature about economic complexity usually identifies
it as a relevant positive source of economic progress (Hausmann et al., 2007; Hidalgo and Hausmann,
2009; Felipe et al., 2012). Our simulations suggest that the macro implications of financial complexity
are much more nuanced, to say the least. On the one hand, we find that financial complexity may lead to
faster economic growth by allowing financial institutions to extend more resources to both households and
real economy firms, which are then enabled to increase both consumption and investment expenditures.
On the other hand, better growth records are matched with heightened macroeconomic volatility and,
perhaps more relevantly, with a considerably higher tendency to the endogenous generation of large
financial shocks. Last but not least, the introduction in financial markets of complex financial products
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tends to give rise to worsening income and wealth distributions, which in turn seems to stimulate even
further the production of such opaque financial commodities in the context of what might be labelled
as a rentier-friendly economy. Actually, this finding is completely at odds with the empirical evidence
put forward by Hartmann et al. (2017) according to which higher degrees of economic complexity (rather
than financial complexity) contribute to reduce income inequality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short review of the existing literature on
financial innovation, financial complexity, and its relations with the real-side of the economy. In this
section, we also explain how the underlying philosophy to the concept of economic complexity may
somehow applied to the financial world. Sections 3 and 4 illustrate the main features and the rationale
of our AB-SFC macro model. Section 5 presents the simulation results. Section 6 draws conclusions on
the peculiar macroeconomic effects of financial complexity.
2 Literature review
The relationship between finance and economic development dates back to Schumpeter’s description of
the economic development process in capitalist economies. On the one hand, Schumpeter (as well as
other evolutionary economists such as Carlota Perez later in his tradition - see Kregel (2009)) attributes
to innovation initiatives and innovative ideas by entrepreneurs in the real sector of the economy, in
manufacturing in particular, the primacy as leading forces behind economic dynamics. On the other
hand, however, Schumpeter itself recognizes the fundamental importance of bankers as the economic
actors that effectively enable entrepreneurs to carry out “new combinations” (of goods and processes) by
extending to them the required financial resources (see Schumpeter (1934)). In a way, whilst innovation
in the real sector of the economy is the “king” of economic dynamics, finance and banker “is the ephor
of the exchange economy” (Schumpeter, 1934, p.74).1
In a series of more recent contributions, Levine (1997) and Levine (2005) tend to emphasize the role of
financial development as independent and autonomous source of economic dynamics regardless of possible
first moves in the real side of the economy. According to this view, a more developed financial system, i.e.,
a financial system capable to intermediate a larger amount of resources between savers and investors via
both bank-centered and market-centered mechanisms, may boost growth by improving the monitoring,
screening and information-generating functions performed by financial systems, by reducing transaction
costs, by providing better hedge against risks, and ultimately by improving the efficient allocation of
funds among alternative investment projects. A similar reshuﬄing of the balance between finance and
the real economy, even though in a completely different theoretical framework and with different systemic
and policy implications, comes from Minsky. Indeed, from Minsky’s own words, “those who finance a
Schumpeterian innovator always have novel problems in structuring the financing [so that] two sets of
new combinations, in production and in finance, drive the evolution of the economy” (Minsky, 1988, p.3).
And Kregel (2009) puts this point even more bluntly by stating that “it is financial innovation in the
financial sector that provides the increased financing that allows for the exploration and installation of
the new technological paradigm” (Kregel, 2009, p.205).
There is not a one-to-one matching from Levine-type financial development to Minskyan financial
innovation and, ultimately, to financial complexity at the centre of our analysis. Yet, the processes of
economic and financial development Levine describes seem to be associated with a change in the structure
of finance from a bank-based to a more market-based financial system (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999).
Such a change in turn implies institutional innovations (the emergence of institutional investors, pension
and hedge funds, money market mutual funds and broaker-and dealers) as well as innovations in terms
of new financial products, i.e., issuance of new financial instruments such as certificates of deposit,
derivatives, commercial papers, and asset-backed securities. Finally, there are little doubts that these
innovations give rise to an increasing degree of complexity characterizing financial systems and financial
products.
There are at least two dimensions through which we can detect the increasing complexity of finance,
and by which we can somehow show the similarity between our concept of financial complexity and the
1The “ephor was an elected magistrate of Sparta who exercised supervisory powers over the kings” (see (Minsky, 1988,
p.8)).
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concept of economic complexity as it is normally understood.
First, the above-mentioned development of financial systems undoubtedly generated an expansion in
the variety of financial products offered by financial institutions to their clients. The introduction of
commercial papers and of securitized financial products, i.e. the financial product innovations at the
center of our computational analysis, are clear examples of such expanding variety. In the jargon of
economic complexity, this may be conceived as a finance version of a more diversified productive system
and production space.
Secondly, a possible definition of financial complexity consists in the costs one has to incur in order
to search, collect, process and understand all the information needed to evaluate the performance of a
given financial product (Awrey, 2012). Well: in the case of the securitized products at the centre of the
last financial crisis, “even the most (ostensibly) sophisticated counterparties failed to grasp their techni-
cal nuances, [and supposedly well-informed] market participants did not fully appreciate how the unique
structure of sub-prime mortgages made the MBS and CDOs into which they were repackaged particularly
sensitive to volatility in the underlying home prices” (Awrey, 2012, p.250). Indeed, the production and
issuance of such products have been made possible only by recent advances in financial theory, informa-
tion technology and computer-based computations. And these advances has been in turn achieved only
through the astonishing increase in the share of physicists, mathematicians and engineers increasingly
employed in the finance industry with respect to other sectors (Philippon and Reshef, 2012; Marin and
Vona, 2017). From our perspective, such evidence closely resembles the idea, so central in the litera-
ture on economic complexity, of (non-financial) products complexity as indicator of the organizational,
managerial, institutional and technological capabilities implicitly needed for their production.
An additional factor of complexity, perhaps specific to the case of structured financial products, is
worth mentioning. It is more related to the concept of system complexity if not product complexity.
Indeed, the returns of complex structured financial products relies upon the performance of potentially
a myriad of underlying assets, say loans or tranches of loans to different households and firms. This fact
tremendously increases the degree of “disperse interaction” and interconnectedness of the economy. In
fact, the financial behavior (i.e., the capacity to meet outstanding payment commitments) of a relatively
restricted bunch of agents, say sub-prime borrowers, may affect the decisions and future actions of the
much wider set of nodes, i.e., securitizing institutions and/or investors, now involved in “originate-and-
distribute” networks with respect to what is usual in the traditional “originate-and-hold” scheme.2
Given the similarity between the concept of economic/product complexity and the concept of financial
complexity just discussed, it is worth wondering whether similarities persist even as to their economy-
wide implications. More specifically, a higher degree of economic complexity is usually seen as indicator
of more advanced economic development and predictor of brighter economic opportunities in the future.
Can we attribute these same positive features to increasing financial complexity?
The mainstream literature on financial development would likely provide a positive answer. For
instance, this is the case of Levine (1997) when he stresses the positive effects on economic growth of
international financial liberalization, enabling foreign banks to introduce a larger variety of financial
products such as commercial papers in hosting countries. A similar conclusion might be drawn from the
fact that commercial papers represented a cheaper and counter-cyclical source of finance (with respect
to banks’ loans) for those non-financial firms that managed to enter the commercial papers market
(Calomiris et al., 1995).
As far as complex structured financial products are concerned, they were originally meant as useful
financial instruments enhancing financial intermediation and, hence, supporting economic growth. The
creation of large secondary market for mortgage-backed securities, for instance, was considered as a pow-
erful vehicle for allowing mortgage originators to extend mortgages even to credit-constrained households,
traditionally cut off from credit circuits. This would have in turn fostered (US) home ownership and the
expansion of the housing sector. By the same vein, massive issuance of securities backed by a variety of
2The expression “originate-and-distribute” refers to a financial system in which assets generated by financial institutions
(mainly banks) via the concession of credit were kept on the balance sheets of the originating institutions. Accordingly,
they monitored with care the extension of new loans and, at the same time, were tightly monitored by monetary authorities
(Dymski, 2010). In the more recent “originate-and-distribute” scheme, original assets, and the corresponding risks, are
transferred to a multitude of actors, with the effect of giving rise to a much looser screening of borrowers’ riskiness and a
much more dispersive (and hard to control) network of financially interconnected actors.
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loans such as home-equity loans, car loans, student loans and credit card receivables3 might have helped
to support consumption and allow for the emergence of a finance-led consumption-centered growth regime
(Boyer, 2010).4
The outbreak of the last financial crisis has severely shacked the above belief in the virtues of financial
innovations and of the connected complexity. At a micro level, economists questioned the alleged high
degree of safety characterizing complex asset-backed securities. Indeed, structured financial products
turned out to be much more exposed to systemic risks than thought before (Coval et al., 2009; Gorton,
2010). And their high degree of complexity and opaqueness actually turned out as voluntary outcomes
of asset-backed securities and CDOs producers’ production techniques aimed at exploiting asymmetric
information, and hidden mismatch between (effective) returns and risk, resulting in higher mark-ups
(Furfine, 2012; Celerier and Vallee, 2017; Ghent et al., 2017). In a similar vein, the common perception
of commercial papers as liquid, reliable and (almost) risk-free financial instruments providing (financial
and non-financial) corporations with cheap external funds twisted. This is particularly true for asset-
backed commercial papers mostly issued by financial institutions, due to the newly-settled mistrust in
the complex underlying assets (say mortgage-backed securities). But the same could be said for simple
commercial papers directly or indirectly (i.e., via the intermediation of financial subsidiaries) by large
non-financial corporations, which, in the wake of the crisis, had to divert to other long-term much more
expensive forms of external finance (Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2010).
From a more structural and macroeconomic perspective, i.e., the focus of this paper, the financial crisis
sparked concerns about the fragility of the macroeconomic regime that the above financial products and
the connected financial complexity gave rise to. A regime which was mainly based on high consumption
expenditures carried out by increasingly indebted households in the context of increasingly unequal
economies (Boyer, 2010; Russo et al., 2016; Botta, Caverzasi and Tori, 2018; Caverzasi et al., 2018).
On the other hand, the crisis confirmed the original Minsky’s conviction that financial innovations play
a fundamental destabilizing role and can lead to boom-and-bust dynamics out of period of relative
tranquility, so that “explosive business cycles rather than steady growth is likely to be the normal result
of the financing process” (Minsky, 1988, p.11). On the other hand, it also casted doubts on the long-run
“dynamic efficiency” of a modern economy dominated by “money managers”, i.e., large institutional
investors, hedge and pension funds, money market mutual funds, whose demand for maximum returns
at minimum risk structured financial products and commercial papers were meant to cater.
As said before, in this paper we do not focus on potentially non-linear long-run relationship between
recent financial developments, financial complexity and economic growth, which has been recently pointed
by a series of complementary contributions (see Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012); Law and Singh (2014);
Arcand et al. (2015)). We rather put our attention on the pure macroeconomic regime that, in a demand-
driven economy, can emerge from the production of increasingly complex financial products and from
the development of an increasingly complex financial system. In sections 3 and 4 below, we provide a
detailed description of the main features of our model.
3 The model
We propose a hybrid AB-SFC model with all sectors at the aggregate level but the households sector.
This methodology preserves the main advantages of both approaches (Caverzasi and Russo, 2018). In
a nutshell, the AB approach allows to analyse the emergence of macroeconomic phenomena from the
interaction of heterogeneous agents at the micro level. The rigorous macro accounting structure inherited
from SFC models (Godley and Lavoie, 2007; Caverzasi and Godin, 2014) ensures that all inter-sectoral
flows and feedbacks are accounted for. We limit heterogeneity to the households sector only in order to
make the interpretation of the results much clearer than in full-fledge AB models, but we maintain the
network complexity ensuing from the structured financial products considered in this model.
3According to Awrey (2012), between 1985 and 2011 the stock of non mortgage-related asset-backed securities astonish-
ingly increased by 1800 percent.
4Consistently with this logic, Hoffmann and Nitschka (2012) note that the international commercialization of mortgage
asset-backed securities positively contributed to smooth domestic credit cycles and consumption volatility associated to
shocks.
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The model builds on Botta, Caverzasi, Russo, Gallegati and Stiglitz (2018) and aims at representing
the development of the financial system. As discussed in Section 2, this evolution is portrayed as a four-
stage process. We model the increase in financial complexity as both the rise in the number of financial
assets and institutions, as well as the increasing sophistication of financial instruments (see Appendix A).
We start with a closed economy composed of five sectors (stage 1 ): a collection of N heterogeneous
households, and four aggregate sectors, namely non-financial firms (NFFs), commercial banks (CBs),
investment funds (i.e. non-bank financial intermediaries - IF henceforth), and the government. This
stage is characterized by a rather underdeveloped financial system. The only external source of funds
for NFFs are CBs’ loans, while government’s bonds are the only financial asset available for investment
funds, besides banks’ deposits.
In stage 2, the financial market evolves. NFFs have direct access to the financial market and issue
commercial papers, which represent a cheaper source of funds with respect to CBs’ loans and allow them
to circumvent possible banks’ credit rationing.
Stage 3 reproduces a developed financial system. Structured financial products come into play. A
new financial sector – Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) – emerges and allows CBs to move a portion of
their loans out of their balance sheet. Loans will then be transformed into collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) and eventually sold on demand to IFs.
Finally, in stage 4 commercial papers disappear and the financial system specializes in structured
financial products. All the sectors of our economy but the government are directly involved in the
process that leads to the production and allocation of CDOs. Just as in the real world, in our model the
securitization of loans determine a disperse interaction between a multitude of different borrowers and
financial investors.
Each of the various financial institutions has different characteristics and plays a different role in the
economy.
• The commercial banks sector creates (credit-)money in the form of deposits by issuing loans to
households or NFFs, and buys all the government bonds not purchased by IFs. CBs apply a
specific interest rate to each individual household and to NFFs according to each borrower’s cred-
itworthiness. This, coupled with considerations on its own financial stability, may lead banks to
ration credit. In stages 3 and 4, CBs pass the interests collected on the securitized loans and profits
in the form of dividends to IFs.
• IFs represent non-banking financial intermediaries which collect funds from households by issuing
IFs’ shares. IFs allocate collected funds among the financial assets available in each stage of financial
development. At stage 1, IFs make a portfolio choice between government bonds and banks’ deposit
only. In stage 2, we introduce commercial papers, whilst in stage 3 also CDOs are available as
additional investment options. In stage 4, commercial papers are called off. Returns on financial
assets are entirely transferred to the owners of IFs’ shares.
• We add SPVs to the economy in stages 3 and 4. They play the very specific role of performing
the securitization process and transforming financial inputs into more complex financial assets
(Caverzasi and Russo, 2018). SPVs buy loans from CBs and transform them into CDOs. SPVs
perform a rather passive role, as they issue on demand the CDOs requested by the financial market,
and obtain from CBs, still on demand, the loans needed as input for the production of structured
securities. SPVs pass all cash flows on securitized loans to the buyers of CDOs, namely IFs.
To better capture the impacts of the evolution of the financial sector on the economy, the real side
of our model is kept rather simple. NFFs produce a homogenous good used for both consumption and
investment purposes. Investment in real capital and the desired level of deposits are financed primarily
through retained profits and, whenever these are not enough, through external financing, i.e., banks’
loans or issuance of commercial papers (in stages 2 and 3). In the event of banks’ credit rationing, or
insufficient demand for commercial papers, NFFs may need to diminish deposits in order to meet their
financial or investment needs.
Households have two sources of income: (i) labor income (i.e., wages); (ii) financial income, i.e., returns
on IFs’ shares. Moreover, they can meet their desired levels of consumption and financial accumulation
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by applying for loans to CBs. If credit is rationed, households revise their decisions, starting from assets
holding down to effective consumption.
Finally, the government sector issues bonds, bought by CBs and IFs, to finance outlays not covered
by the tax revenues.
3.1 The sequence of events
The timeline of events in each of the T simulation periods is the following:
1 Households receive their labor income and pay taxes on wage.
2.1 Financial payments: returns on non-structured financial assets (i.e., interests on government bonds,
interests on households’ and NFFs’ loans) are paid; CBs’ profits are transferred to IFs.
2.2 Returns on commercial papers are paid by NFFs to IFs (in stages 2 and 3).
2.3 Interests on securitized loans pass from CBs to IFs via SPVs in order to remunerate CDOs’ holders
(from Stage 3).
3 IFs compute returns on their assets to remunerate holders of IFs’ shares. Non performing loans
due to households missing payment commitments diminish returns on CDOs and, consequently, on
IFs’ shares.
4 Households make consumption and savings decisions.
5 If needed, households apply for loans to CBs.
6 CBs decide whether to accomodate households’ demand for loans.
7 In case of credit rationing, households revise their decisions.
8 The government implements spending decisions.
9 NFFs define investments in real capital and the desired level of deposits.
10 If retained profit do not fully cover their decisions, NFFs increase their liabilities by applying for
loans to CBs or, in stages 2 and 3, by issuing commercial papers.
11 CBs decide whether to fully accomodate NFFs’ demand for loans.
12 In case of credit rationing, NFFs revise their decisions, scaling down their stock of deposits.
13 The government finances its deficit by issuing public bonds.
14 IFs perform their portfolio choice, allocating collected funds among government bonds, deposits,
commercial papers (stages 2 and 3), and CDOs (stage 3 and 4).
15 CBs buy all bonds not purchased by IFs.
4 Behavioral equations
Let’s now move to the description of agents’ and sectors’ behavioral equations. Due to space constraints,
here we present only the main equations of the model. See Appendix B for a complete list. The following
notations apply through all the model: the suffices i and t define individual households and the simulation
period, respectively.
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4.1 Commercial Banks
CBs make two key decisions. First, they set households’ and NFFs-specific interest rates on conceded
loans. Second, based on borrowers’ creditworthiness, they decide whether to ration credit. These decisions
can be conceived as a three-step process.
First, the expected specific interest rate for each individual household and for NFFs applying for loans
is computed as a mark-up on previous period bond rate iBt−1. Unlike individual households, the NFFs
sector may be subjected to partial credit rationing only. We therefore assume the expected and actual
interest rates to coincide for the NFFs sector.
E[rhi,t] = i
B
t−1 + i
B
t−1
Lhi,t−1 + ∆Lh∗i,t
yni,t
(1)
E[rft ] = r
f
t = i
B
t−1 + i
B
t−1
Lft−1 + ∆Lf∗t
Pft
(2)
Equations (1) and (2) tell us that the higher the ratio of the ‘notional’ (i.e. assuming the loan ∆L∗
being granted) level of indebtedness over, respectively, net households’ income and NFFs’ revenues, the
higher the mark-up. yni,t stands for net households’ income as given by the net wage (wi,t − taxwi,t) plus
the returns on (IFs’) share holding (rshSHi,t). Pft represents NFFs’ revenues.
Second, CBs compute notional borrowers’ debt service ratios:
mh∗i,t = E[r
h
i,t]
Lhi,t−1 + ∆Lh∗i,t
ydi,t
(3)
mf∗i,t = E[r
f
i,t]
Lfi,t−1 + ∆Lf∗i,t
Pft
(4)
Third, CBs compare notional debt service ratios with the endogenous threshold ψt, which is inversely
related to CBs’ financial soundness as measured by the distance of CBs’ leverage from Basel-type capital
requirements (k). In Equation (5), ω is an exogenous parameter influencing CBs sensitivity to balance
sheet’s conditions, whilst ψ¯ is the exogenous maximum acceptable level of debt service ratio. The higher
CBs financial fragility, the more CBs will be hesitant to securing new loans. Equation (6) represents our
proxy for CBs leverage, here measured as safe assets (i.e., government bonds) over CBs’ total assets at
stages 1 and 2. Equation (7), where z is the quota of securitized loans, refers to stages 3 and 4.
ψt = max
(
ψ¯, ψ¯ + ω(kt−1 − k)
)
(5)
kB,t =
BB,t
[Lt +BB,t]
(6)
kB,t =
BB,t
[(1− zt)Lt +BB,t] (7)
It is self-evident how higher levels of z are associated with less prudent behaviors, and may therefore
ease credit supply and the concession of riskier loans. Whenever m exceeds ψ, credit rationing takes
place. In the case of individual households, this leads to a complete refusal of the loan. In the case of the
NFFs sector, rationing is partial and the loan eventually granted (∆Lf) is diminished until mf∗i,t equates
ψ¯.
Next to their role of credit provider for the private sector, CBs purchase government bonds not bought
by IFs. They finally pass all their profits to IFs. Both these behaviors are better described in the next
section.
4.2 Investment Funds
IFs intermediate between households and financial markets. Their portfolio choices change significantly
between the different stages of financial development, as their options increase with the complexity of the
financial sector.
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In stage 1, IFs update the demand for government bonds following an adaptive rule based on the
observed year-to-year difference in bonds’ yields, allocating the remaining funds to deposits. In our
model, government bonds represent a safe asset. Bonds’ yields stand as a premium for their lower
liquidity with respect to CBs deposits. Liquidity is relevant to IFs insofar as it might protect them from
the risk of a liquidity crisis may rentier households want to redeem a significant part of IFs’ shares.
qbif,t = min
{
0.1, qbif,t−1[1− β(iBt−1 − iBt )]
}
(8)
DIF,t = (1− qbif,t)SH (9)
Equation (8) tells us that the higher the return on public bonds with respect to the previous period,
the more IFs will increase their demand for bonds. Moreover, the share of collected funds allocated to
government bonds cannot be less than 10% of total IFs’ assets. This is to capture the effects of regulatory
constraints about portfolio compositions different kinds of financial intermediaries have to comply with.
Parameter β represents the sensitivity with respect to this inter-temporal spread. The remaining funds
are allocated to deposits (Equation (10)).
In stage 2, things get slightly more complex with the introduction of commercial papers, i.e., a riskier
and more remunerative portfolio choice with respect to public bonds.
DIF,t = σSHt (10)
BDIF,t = q
b
if,tSHt(1− σ) (11)
qbif,t = min
{
0.1, qbif,t−1[1− β[(rcp − iBt )− (rcp,t−1 − iBt−1)]
}
(12)
CPDIF,t = SHt −DIF,t −BDIF,t (13)
In this stage, the stock of deposits is set as a fix amount σ of collected funds (Equation (10)).
The share of remaining funds invested in government bonds varies with the change in their relative
remunerativeness. Equation (12) differs from Equation (8) as the year-to-year change in the return on
bonds is now compared with the change in the return on commercial papers (rcp). Equation (15) defines
the demand for commercial papers. If NFFs issue less commercial papers than IFs demand, IFs’ deposits
act as buffer stock.
In Stage 3, a further step is added to IFs’ portfolio choice by introducing structured financial products,
i.e., CDOs.
qbif,t = min
{
0.1, qbif,t−1[1− β[(rr − iBt )− (rr − iBt−1)]
}
(14)
CPDIF,t = SHt −DIF,t −BDIF,t (15)
At this stage, IFs compare the return on government bonds to a weighted average (rr) of the returns
on risky assets, i.e., commercial papers and CDOs (Equation (16)). The quota of the demand for risky
assets (RAD) allocated to CDOs increases together with their relative remunerativeness, as shown in
Equation (18).
CDODif,t = (SH −DIF,t−)min
{
0.1, qbif,t−1[1− β[(rr − iBt )− (rrt−1 − iBt−1)]
}
(16)
RADIF,t = SHt −DIF,t −BDIF,t (17)
CDOD = RAD ∗ r
cdo
t
rcdot + r
cp
t
(18)
4.3 Special Purpose Vehicles
SPVs appear in our economy at Stage 3. Equation (19) shows that the demand for CDOs by IFs drives
the portion (zt) of heterogenous households’ and NFFs’ debt SPVs will buy from CBs in order to produce
CDOs.
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zt
N∑
i=1
Lhi,t + ztLft = CDOif,t (19)
rcdot =
zt[(
∑N
i=1
˜rhi,t−1Lhi,t−1) + r
f
t−1Lft−1]
CDOif,t−1
(20)
Equation (20) shows that the return on CDOs is given by a portion (z) of total interests paid on CBs’
loans. The tilde in Equation (20) reminds us that non performing interests reduce the remunerativeness
of CBs’ credit and, consequently, of CDOs.5
4.4 Households
Households have two sources of income: wages wi,t and returns on IFs’ shares r
sh. Similarly, they have
two different obligations: one fiscal (taxes on wage) and one financial (interests to be paid on their
outstanding stock of debt). These two components determine their disposable income (Equation (21)).
ydi,t = wi,t − taxwi,t + rshSHi,t − ˜rhi,t−1Lhi,t−1 (21)
All households are created equal in terms of wealth, as all assets are set equal to zero at the beginning
of the simulation. However wages differ as the total wage bill - set exogenously as a fix proportion λ of the
capital stock - is distributed according to a stochastic process. At the beginning, individual wage quotas
are drawn from a log-normal distribution (with log-standard deviation θ). The ranking in wage income is
kept constant but differences among individual wages emerge due to the evolution of the aggregate wage
bill.
The model includes a progressive taxation system as the tax rate taxw on wages increases above a cer-
tain threshold, set equal to the median wage rate. The last component of disposable income ˜rhi,t−1Lhi,t−1
represents ‘effective’ interest payment. Indeed, households may be unable to meet their financial obli-
gations, hence determining a non performing interest given by the difference between due and effective
interest payments.6
Once disposable income is computed, households decide their desired level of consumption and define
their portfolio choices.
c∗i,t = cyydi,t + cnc¯t−1 (22)
(23)
Desired consumption (Equation (22)) depends on the propensity to consume cy out of disposable
income plus a ‘socially determined component’ cn, which depends on the previous period average con-
sumption. This second component of Equation (22) has the double role of capturing the well-known
fact that consumption propensity decreases with higher levels of income, as well as the influence of
consumption norms (or external habit formation) on individual choices.
Dh∗i,t = ηWHi,t−1 (24)
Sh∗i,t = Shi,t−1[1 + σ(
rshi,t−1
Shi,t−1
− iBi,t−1)] (25)
5In this model we assume that households inability to meet their financial commitments impacts equally securitized and
non-securitized loans.
6In stages 3 and 4, households paying interests on past debt concur in determining the return of CDOs and therefore the
return on shares, which is one of the sources of income they may use to cover their outlays, financial obligations included.
This circular mechanism is solved through a recursive process, in which returns on shares are used to cover due interest
payments, which in turn determine a further flow of returns for the holders of IFs’ shares. This process ends whenever a
further round of payments cover less than 10% of due interests.
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The stock of deposits that households decide to hold is defined as a fix share of their individual
wealth (Equation (24)). An adaptive process based on the difference between the returns on IFs’ shares
(rshi,t−1/Shi,t−1) and public bonds (iBi,t−1) determines the desired stock of shares (Equation 25)
∆Dh∗i,t = Dh
∗ −Dhi,t−1 (26)
∆Sh∗i,t = Sh
∗
i,t − Shi,t−1 (27)
∆Lh∗i,t = ∆Dh
∗
i,t + ∆Sh
∗
i,t − s∗i,t (28)
The desired flows of deposits and shares simply result from accounting identities (Equations (26) and
(27)), with s∗i,t as desired savings. Whenever desired consumption and the desired acquisition of IFs’
shares and deposits exceed desired savings, households may apply for a loan from CBs (Equations (28)).
If rationed, households are forced to scale down their investment and, if needed, stock of shares. May
this not be enough, the same is done with deposits. Finally, consumption can be reduced to a bottom
subsistence level. Conversely, if the flow of savings exceeds the target flows of deposits and shares, the
surplus is used to deleverage: the stock of loans is diminished. In the event a household succeeds in
paying back his whole debt, the surplus will be accumulated in the form of deposits.
4.5 Non-financial Firms
The NFFs sector takes three decisions: (i) how much to invest in real capital; (ii) the amount of deposit
holding; (iii) how to finance their investment choices.
As to the investment in real capital (see Equation (29)), it is rather standard and depends positively
on the observed profitability of the aggregate sector – as captured by the profit share (Πt−1/Yt−1) – and
on the observed capital utilization (ut−1 = Yt−1/Kt−1), with γ1 and γ2 being positive parameters. A
stochastic element (Zt, with γ3 > 0) is included in Equation (29) to capture the influence of entrepreneurs’
animal spirits. NFFs choose to hold a stock of deposit equal to a fraction η of their capital stock for
transaction and precautionary purposes.
It = γ1
Πt−1
Yt−1
+ γ2ut−1 + γ3Zt (29)
Df,t = ηKt (30)
In order to cover the difference between available funds (i.e. net retained profit) and the cost of their
investment choices, NFFs revert to external funds. At stage 1 of financial development, this means simply
CBs’ loans.
Pft = (1− τ3)ΠF,t −RLf,t (31)
∆Lft = I + ∆Df,t − Pft (32)
In stages 2 and 3, they cover an exogenous share χ of their needs for external funds by issuing
commercial papers, and revert to the banking sector for the rest.
∆CPf,t = χ(I + ∆Df,t − Pft) (33)
∆Lft = I + ∆Df,t − Pft −∆CPf,t (34)
In the event that the demand for commercial papers falls short of the supply, or in the event of credit
rationing by CBs, NFFs’ deposits will act as buffer stock to accomodate NFFs’ investments in real assets.
rcp = (1− µ)rft−1 + ø
CPSf,t−1 − CPDif,t−1
CPSf,t−1 + CP
D
if,t−1
(35)
Equation (35) tell us that the return on commercial papers is set as a mark-down µ on the previous
period interest rate on NFFs’ loans, but it can increase (or decrease), at the speed set by the exogenous
parameter ø in case of an excess supply (excess demand) in the previous period.
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4.6 Government
We assume a very simple rule for public purchases, which are a fixed proportion ξ of the previous-period
aggregate consumption.
Gt = ξCt−1 (36)
The government collects taxes from both firms and households. To cover its deficit, it issues public
bonds, which are purchased by CBs and IFs in a recursive process that mimics the auction for public
bonds in the US economy. The process (see Equation (37)) starts with the previous-period interest rate.
IFs, whose role simulates that of competitive bidders, set their demand according to their behavioral rule.
CBs, i.e., non-competitive bidders, are ready to buy all the remaining bonds issued. In the event the
share of bonds that CBs will need to buy to clean the market is higher (lower) with respect to previous
period, the interest rate will increase (decrease) of a small amount (φ). A new round begins. IFs and
subsequently CBs update their demand. The process ends when a further increase of the interest rate
leads to an increase in IFs’ demand lower than α.
rbt = r
b
t−1[1 + α(
BB,t
GDt
− BB,t−1
GDt−1
)] (37)
5 Simulations
The behaviour of the model, in its different stages, is analysed by means of computer simulations.7 The
values of the parameters are listed in Appendix C and, as consuetudinary in the literature, are set through
model calibration and based on empirical grounds whenever is possible to identify a direct association
with real data. To investigate the behavior of the economy in different scenarios, we run a battery of
Monte Carlo experiments. Each is composed by 100 simulations with different seeds for the pseudo-
random number generation process, which involves investment and wages. The scenarios correspond to
the above mentioned stages of evolution of the financial system:
• a first baseline scenario (stage 1 ) that neither includes commercial papers nor CDOs;
• a second scenario (stage 2 ) that involves commercial papers but it does not consider CDOs;
• a third scenario (stage 3 ) that includes both commercial papers and CDOs;
• a forth scenario (stage 4 ) with CDOs and no commercial papers.
Our findings are reported in Table 5. We implemented a two-sample t-Test for equal means (only on
the first moments of Monte Carlo distributions) to assess whether simulation results in the second, third
and forth scenarios are statistically different from the first one (stage 1 ). As to scenario 2 (stage 2 ), the
test never rejects the null hypothesis except for both the Gini indexes on income and wealth inequality,
the stock of loans over GDP, and the spread on NFFs’ financial costs. As to scenario 3 (stage 3 ), the
test never rejects the null hypothesis except for the stock of public debt over GDP, the Gini indexes, the
stock of loans over GDP, the (households sector) debt-to-income ratio, and the stock of IFs’ shares over
GDP. Finally, in the last scenario (stage 4 ), the test always rejects the null hypothesis except for all GDP
shares and the average level of NPLs.
The comparison between the first two scenarios seems to imply that the first increase in complexity
- i.e., the introduction of commercial papers - does not exert a major impact on the economy. Albeit
mean growth not having passed the t-test, the final GDP level suggests that commercial papers might
7In order to get rid of the possible effects of specific initial conditions regarding the balance sheets, we assume all starting
stocks but one to be zero. The only exception, namely NFFs’ capital stock, is set equal to 1 as this is required to put the
economy in motion.
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‘STAGE 1’ ‘STAGE 2’ ‘STAGE 3’ ‘STAGE 4’
No Securitization No Securitization Securitization Securitization
No Commercial Paper Commercial Paper Commercial Paper No Commercial Paper
GDP growth
- Mean 0.0245 0.0247 0.0249 0.0249
- Standard Deviation 0.0161 0.0160 0.0159 0.0159
- Skewness -0.0544 -0.0515 -0.0411 -0.0326
- Kurtosis 2.1009 2.1017 2.1063 2.1192
GDP level* 1 1.1809 1.3511 1.4529
GDP shares
- Consumption 0.5458 0.5460 0.5462 0.5463
- Investment 0.1268 0.1264 0.1261 0.1259
- Public Purchases 0.3275 0.3276 0.3277 0.3278
Public Debt over GDP 2.3859 2.1859 1.9964 1.8924
Gini Indexes
- Income 0.2798 0.2844 0.2885 0.2908
- Wealth 0.7230 0.7294 0.7348 0.7378
Loan Stock over GDP 1.7236 1.6860 1.7535 1.8038
Spread (in bps) on
NFF’s financial costs** 143.76 126.28 143.69 153.78
Debt to Income ratio 0.9594 0.9671 0.9812 0.9906
Share Stock over GDP 0.9381 0.9525 0.9658 0.9738
Comm. Papers over GDP 0 0.4177 0.1736 0
Share of Securitized Loans 0 0 0.1707 0.2768
Non-Performing Loans***
- Mean 0.0116 0.0113 0.0115 0.0117
- Standard Deviation 0.0020 0.0022 0.0024 0.0026
- Skewness 0.8270 0.9057 0.9610 0.9862
- Kurtosis 4.8182 5.2749 5.3817 5.5229
- Crisis Probability**** 0.0190 0.0320 0.0410 0.0490
∗ GDP last period baseline = 1
∗∗ Difference between the average financial payments on both loans and comm. papers and the interest rate on bonds
∗∗∗ Unpaid over due interests on loans
∗∗∗∗ Number of cases for which unpaid over due interest on loans is above 5% over total cases
Table 1: Descriptive statistics comparing the various scenarios (A Two-Sample t-Test for Equal Means
has been implemented to statistically assess the differences among Monte Carlo averages. See the text
for the results).
have had a small positive effect on growth. What emerges manifestly is an advantage for NFFs. The
measure of the financing cost, which is the spread between the interests rate NFFs need to pay on their
liabilities and the interest rate paid by the government on public bonds, decreases significantly (17 base
points), as can be neatly appreciated looking at the bottom right graph of Figure 1. This couples with
the fall in the value of the stock of loans over GDP, which includes the debt of both households and
NFFs (top left graph Figure 1).8 These results are perfectly in line with the goal of commercial papers,
thanks to which NFFs have access to a cheaper source of external finance and are able to decrease their
indebtedness level. A side effect of this financial innovation is the increase in inequality as testified by the
two Gini indexes on income (see Figure 1 top right graph) and wealth. This is due to the fact that only
wealthier households hold IFs’ shares, whose remuneration in this second stage increases, being based on
a further, more lucrative asset, next to government bonds. The presence of commercial papers in the
8The numerous red crosses show are outliers of the distribution which correspond to crisis events.
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economy therefore boosts the rentier-type source of income of the better offs, thus worsening inequality.
A final, perhaps less expected, result regards non-performing loans (NPLs). Crisis probability, as
measured by the number of cases in which unpaid interests exceed 5% of all due interest, increases
sharply, passing from 0.019 to 0.0320. On top of this, the rise in skewness (from 0.83 to 0.91), coupled
with the non-statistical significance of the difference between mean growths of NPLs, indicates that NPLs
are much more right-skewed in scenario 2. The explanation lies in the behavior of households. Indeed,
the higher remunerativeness of shares increases share holders’ disposable income and their consumption
with it. This leads low-income households (which are those needing loans to meet their consumption and
portfolio choices) to get more indebted to keep-up with the increased average level of consumption, hence
increasing the risk of default on the accumulated debt.
Moving to scenario 3 (stage 3 ), the impact of financial development appears more significant with the
introduction of securitization. The final level of GDP suggests that this new financial practice may be
beneficial for economic growth. Debts dynamics, however, completely differ from the previous scenario.
In Section 3, we saw how securitization eases CBs’ credit supply. This more than counterbalance the
effects of commercial papers on total private indebtedness (i.e., the stock of loans over GDP), which
not only increases with respect to the previous scenario (from 1.68 to 1.75) but it is also higher than in
the baseline (1.73), as shown in Figure 1, top left graph. Also, due to the fact that commercial papers
and CDOs are alternative choices in IFs portfolio allocation, the addition of CDOs leads to a significant
decrease of the amount of commercial papers circulating in the economy, which fall from 42% to 17% of
the GDP. A direct consequence of such financial development is the loss of commercial papers-related
advantages for NFFs. Indeed, the difference in the spread between NFFs’ financial costs and government
bonds in scenario 3 and in the baseline is not statistically significant.
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Figure 1: Box plots for selected variables. Top left: total private loan stock over GDP; top right: Gini index on gross
households income; bottom left: public debt over GDP; bottom right: spread between the interest rate on public bonds and
the weighted average interest rate that firms need to pay on their liabilities. The numbers from 1 to 4 on the horizontal
axis indicate the stages.
As required by macro-accounting (sectoral balances) relations, in our closed economy a rise in the
private level of indebtedness implies a reduction in public indebtedness. The ratio of public debt over
GDP decreases from 2.39 in the baseline scenario to 2.00 in scenario 3 (see bottom left graph, Figure 1).
On top of having an impact on the credit market, the introduction of CDOs also affects the financial
market. Indeed, CDOs represent an additional high-yield asset in IFs’ portfolios. Accordingly, IFs’ shares
become even more remunerative, so that the stock of IFs’ shares held by households rises, with respect
to GDP, from 0.94 to 0.96. The increasing degree of financialization of the economies goes hand-in-hand
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with rising crisis probability, which further increases from 0.032 in scenario 2 to 0.041 in scenario 3. So
does the skewness of NPLs. This finds a double explanation in this scenario. On the one hand, CDOs
increase the remunerativeness of IFs’ shares’, so that the dynamics already observed in scenario 2 gets
even more pronounced. On the other hand, securitization makes credit creation easier, so that even less
‘creditworthy’ borrowers may now get access to CBs loans. Last but not least, in the third stage of financial
evolution, a reinforcing dynamics kicks in. When households start defaulting, the remunerativeness of
CDOs falls and this may hamper the ability of other households to meet their financial obligations, as
they see their financial income decreased. This two-sided effects of securitization, one linked to borrower
and the other to financial investors, explains also the rise in inequality. More households get indebted and
have a further monetary outflows, as they need to meet their financial commitments. This is mirrored
by an increase in the financial inflow for share holders, which see their rentier-type income increase.
Moving to the last scenario (stage 4 ), all results are qualitative coherent with the second stage of
financial development but increase in magnitude. Securitization, which passes from 17% to 28% of banks
loans, has a positive effect on growth and decreases public indebtedness. This comes at the expenses of
an increase in income and wealth inequality, and a rise of private indebtedness, as portrayed in Figure 1.
Most importantly the probability of a crisis to occur peaks (0.049). The causal links (as exemplified by
the rise in the skewness) are the same as in the previous scenarios.
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Figure 2: IFs’ balance sheet composition over GDP. The area plot shows how the composition of IFs’ balance sheet (blue
for deposits; orange for government bonds; yellow for commercial papers; purple for CDOs) changes in the four stages, top
left being Stage 1, top right Stage 2, bottom left Stage 3, bottom right Stage 4.
The impacts of higher degrees of financial complexity (with respect to the baseline), both in positive
(e.g. growth) and negative (e.g. crisis probability) terms, increase in each of the four stages and have
their acme in the economy whose financial system specialises on more complex financial products (stage
4). Indeed, what seems to matter the most for our results is the composition of IFs’ balance sheet, as
portrayed in Figure 2. The higher the quota of CDOs in the financial system, the stronger the simulation
results. A larger presence of more complex financial instruments like CDOs (Figure 2, bottom right) has
a greater effect than a higher level of variety of financial products (bottom left). Our results, therefore,
can be considered more in line with the second of the two dimensions of financial complexity mentioned in
Section 2. The increase in financial products’ complexity exerts stronger effects than the increase in the
variety of assets traded in the financial systems. This is not only with respect of stage 2, which presents
the same level of variety in financial products, but also with respect to stage 3, which is the one with the
highest variety, or we may say, widest (financial) production space.
Finally, our results question the view of higher degrees of financial developments having plain positive
impacts on the economy (Levine, 1997). On the one hand, the capacity of higher degrees of financial
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complexity of fostering growth thanks to finance-led consumption, as described by Boyer (2010), is
confirmed by the model. The same holds true for the rise of credit associated with CDOs. On the other
hand, however, just as described by Boyer (2010) himself and Russo et al. (2016), a system in which high
levels of consumption are sustained by the rising indebtedness of households, in the context of increasingly
unequal economies, is bound to be prone to financial fragility. To better appreciate under this perspective
the results of our simulations, it is important to keep in mind that some features of our model mitigate
the effects of a crisis. Indeed, we assume the aggregate sectors not to go bankrupt. Nonetheless, the
economic system with CDOs and without commercial papers is the one experiencing not only the highest
growth but also the most severe and frequent crises.
6 Concluding remarks
Since the end of the 1970s, financial systems have gone through structural changes often leading financial
actors to depart from their traditional role as support institutions of real-side economic activity. The
spread of financial engineering and the proliferation of complex financial products represent glaring out-
comes of these changes. In this paper, we proposed an AB-SFC macro model aimed at studying how
increasing financial complexity may affect economic growth and macroeconomic stability. Differently
from the literature on product complexity a` la Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), financial complexity does
not seem to be always related to better economic performances. Indeed, simulation results show that
more complex financial systems may well result in higher economic growth rates but at the cost of more
macroeconomic instability, thus making the system more crisis-prone. Moreover, while Hartmann et al.
(2017) find that more economic complexity tends to reduce inequality, financial complexity rather works
the other way around. However, this is not surprising giving that growing inequality boosts the creation
of bank (credit-)money through the loans provided to households and NFFs that, at the same time, con-
stitute the raw material used in the securitization process for the production of new structured financial
products eventually sold to rentiers. Accordingly, financial payments on bank loans, typically coming
from low-to-middle income households, feed rich households who invested in high-return financial prod-
ucts provided by financial intermediaries, resulting in higher economic growth (because of a wealth-effect
for the rich and a stable or even rising consumption for the poor despite declining real incomes) but also
in a more unequal and financial unstable economic system.
Yet, in order to assess the relationship between financial complexity and macroeconomic performance,
we need to clarify in which way we are measuring complexity. The model we proposed features four stages
that we can relate to the composition of the shares that investment funds (IFs) sell to (rich) households.
In the first stage, namely the baseline scenario, shares only include government bonds, thus resulting in a
relatively low yield. In the second stage, we introduce commercial papers that make the returns on shares
increase. The third stage adds CDOs and the remuneration of IFs’ share rises even more. The forth stage
only considers CDOs, while commercial paper are absent, resulting in the highest returns on share. While
one could be tempted to consider that the third stage is the more financially complex, due to a larger
number of financial products being implicitly included in the IFs’ shares, an alternative interpretation
is that the complexity of the financial system mainly depends on the complexity of certain financial
products (incorporating more knowledge and capabilities), and their degree of diffusion in the financial
system. Given that CDOs, namely the most complex financial products in our simulated economy, are
more widespread in the forth than in the third stage, the former should be considered the most complex
case among the four involved in our analysis.
While measuring complexity based on the varieties of financial products could result in a non-linear
relationship between financial complexity and economic growth, taking into account the complexity of
certain products may lead to a different interpretation according to which increasing financial complexity
makes the economy grow faster (whereas becoming more crisis-prone). Which one is the correct way to
measure financial complexity? Based on simulation results, we are inclined to think that what matters
most is the role played by more complex financial products like CDOs (as in the forth stage of our
simulation analysis), and then that as financial complexity increases we should expect more economic
growth as well as more inequality and financial instability. Although we do not have a definitive answer,
we hope that our findings may stimulate a debate on measuring financial complexity, thus opening the
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field to new theoretical and empirical contributions in this area of investigation.
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Appendix A: Matrices
In this appendix we include the balance sheet and the transaction matrix of the economy. Stage 4 is
obtained setting to zero all variables related to commercial papers.
Households Banks SPV (stage 3) IF Firms Gov Total
Deposits +DH −D +DIF +DSPV +DF 0
Capital +K +K
Shares +Sh −Sh 0
Bonds +BB +BIF −B 0
Loans −LH +(1 − z)L +zL −LF 0
Stage 2: a new asset (commercial papers) is included; SPV is still not included in this scenario
Papers +CP −CP 0
Stage 3: a further asset (Derivatives) and a new sector (SPV) add to the model
Derivatives −CDO +CDO 0
Table 2: Aggregate Balance Sheet (Initial Situation)
Households Banks SPV(Stage 3) IF Firms Govt. Σ
CA KA CA KA CA KA CA KA
TRANSACTIONS
Consumption −C 0 0 0 0 0 0 +C 0 0 0
Publ. Exp. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +G 0 −G 0
Investment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +I −I 0 0
Wages +W 0 0 0 0 0 0 −W 0 0
Taxes −TH 0 0 0 0 0 0 −TF 0 +T 0
Int. on Loans −rhLht − 1 +r(1 − z)L 0 +rzL 0 0 0 −rfLft−1 0 0 0
Return on Shares +RSH 0 0 0 −RSH 0 0 0 0 0
Int. on Bonds 0 +RBB 0 0 0 +RBIF 0 0 0 −RB 0
Dividends 0 −DivB 0 0 0 +DivB 0 0 0 0 0
Stage 2
Return on papers 0 0 0 0 +rcpCP 0 −rcpCP 0 0 0
Stage 3
Return on Deriv. 0 0 0 −fCDO 0 +fCDO 0 0 0 0 0
Saving and Profits +ΠH 0 0 0 0 −ΠIF +ΠIF −ΠF +ΠF 0 0
∆ STOCKS
Deposits −∆DH 0 +∆D 0 0 0 −∆DIF 0 −∆DF 0 0
Loans +∆LH 0 −∆(1 − z)L 0 −∆zL 0 0 0 +∆LF 0 0
Shares −∆Sh 0 0 0 0 0 +∆Sh 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 −∆BB 0 0 0 −∆BIF 0 0 +∆B 0
Stage 2
Papers 0 0 0 0 0 0 −∆CP 0 −∆CP 0 0
Stage 3
Derivatives 0 0 0 0 +∆CDO 0 −∆CDO 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3: Aggregate Transaction Flow Matrix
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Appendix B: Equations
Hereafter, we present the list of equations. The scenario Stage 4 is obtained setting to zero all variables
related to commercial papers.
Commercial Banks
E[rhi,t] = i
B
t−1 + ιi
B
t−1
Lhi,t−1 + ∆Lh∗i,t
yni,t
(1)
if m∗i,t < ψt and ∆Lhi,t = ∆Lh
∗
i,t then r
h
i,t = E[r
h
i,t] (2)
E[rft ] = r
f
t = i
B
t−1 + ιi
B
t−1
Lft−1 + ∆Lf∗t
Pft
(3)
mh∗i,t = E[r
h
i,t]
Lhi,t−1 + ∆Lh∗i,t
ydi,t
(4)
mf∗i,t = E[r
f
i,t]
Lfi,t−1 + ∆Lf∗i,t
Pft
(5)
ψt = max
(
ψ¯, ψ¯ + ω(kt−1 − k)
)
(6)
kB,t =
BB,t
[Lt +BB,t]
(7)
kB,t,STAGE3 =
BB,t
[(1− zt)Lt +BB,t] (8)
BB,t = GDt −BIF,t (9)
RLhB,tt =
N∑
i=1
(1− zt−1)[ ˜rhi,t−1Lhi,t−1] (10)
RLfB,t = (1− zt−1)[rft−1Lft−1] (11)
RBB,t = r
b
t−1BB,t−1 (12)
ΠB,t = RL
h
B,t +RL
f
B,t +RBB,t (13)
Stage 3
CDOif,t = zt
N∑
i=1
Lhi,t + ztLft (14)
zt = min(1,
CDOIF
Lt
) (15)
rcdot =
zt[(
∑N
i=1
˜rhi,t−1Lhi,t−1) + r
f
t−1Lft−1]
CDOif,t−1
(16)
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Investment Funds
DIF,t = σSHt (17)
qbif,t = q
b
if,t−1(1− β[(rcdot − iBt )− (rcdot−1 − iBt−1)] (18)
BDIF,t = q
b
if,tSHt(1− σ) (19)
CDODIF,t = SHt(1− σ)−BIF,t (20)
CDOIF,t = min(ztLt, CDO
D
IF,t) (21)
RCDOIF,t = r
cdo
t−1CDO (22)
RBIF,t = r
b
t−1BIF,t−1 (23)
RSHt = RCDOIF,t +RBIF,t (24)
rshi,t = RSH
shi,t−1
SHt−1
(25)
qbif,t = min
{
0.1, qbif,t−1[1− β(iBt−1 − iBt )] (26)
DIF,t = (1− qbif,t)SH (27)
DIF,t = σSHt (28)
BDIF,t = q
b
if,tSHt(1− σ) (29)
stage 2
qbif,t = min
{
0.1, qbif,t−1[1− β[(rcp − iBt )− (rcp,t−1 − iBt−1)]
}
(30)
CPDIF,t = SHt −DIF,t −BDIF,t (31)
stage 3
qbif,t = min
{
0.1, qbif,t−1[1− β[(rr − iBt )− (rr − iBt−1)]
}
(32)
CPDIF,t = SHt −DIF,t −BDIF,t (33)
CDODif,t = (SH −DIF,t−)min
{
0.1, qbif,t−1[1− β[(rr − iBt )− (rrt−1 − iBt−1)]
}
(34)
RADIF,t = SHt −DIF,t −BDIF,t (35)
CDOD = RAD ∗ r
cdo
t
rcdot + r
cp
t
(36)
Special Purpose Vehicles
zt
N∑
i=1
Lhi,t + ztLft = CDOif,t (37)
zt = min(1,
CDOIF
Lt
) (38)
rcdot =
zt[(
∑N
i=1
˜rhi,t−1Lhi,t−1) + r
f
t−1Lft−1]
CDOif,t−1
(39)
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Households
ydi,t = wi,t − taxwi,t + rshi,t − ˜rhi,t−1Lhi,t−1 (40)
taxwi,t = τ
w
j wi,t
{
if wi,t < wˆt =⇒ taxw = τw1 ∗ wi,t
if wi,t ≥ wˆt =⇒ taxw = τw1 ∗ wˆ + τw2 ∗ (wi,t − wˆt)
(41)
c∗i,t = cyydi,t + cnc¯t−1 (42)
s∗i,t = ydi,t − c∗i,t (43)
Dh∗i,t = ηWHi,t−1 (44)
∆Dh∗i,t = Dh
∗ −Dhi,t−1 (45)
Sh∗i,t = Shi,t−1[1 + σ(
rshi,t−1
Shi,t−1
− iBi,t−1)] (46)
∆Sh∗i,t = Sh
∗
i,t − Shi,t−1 (47)
∆Lh∗i,t = ∆Dh
∗
i,t + ∆Sh
∗
i,t − s∗i,t (48)
if m∗i,t < ψt =⇒

∆Lhi,t = ∆Lh
∗
i,t
∆Shi,t = ∆Sh
∗
i,t
∆Dhi,t = ∆Dh
∗
i,t
ci,t = c
∗
i,t
(49)
if m∗i,t > ψt ⇒ Lhi,t = 0⇒

if s∗i,t > ∆Dh
∗
i,t ⇒

∆Shi,t > 0
∆Shi,t = s
∗
i,t −∆Dh∗i,t
∆Dhi,t = ∆Dh
∗
i,t
ci,t = c
∗
i,t
if s∗i,t < ∆Dh
∗
i,t and s
∗
i,t + Shi,t−1 > ∆Dh
∗
i,t ⇒

∆Shi,t < 0
∆Shi,t = s
∗
i,t −∆Dh∗i,t
∆Dhi,t = ∆Dh
∗
i,t
ci,t = c
∗
i,t
if s∗i,t + Shi,t−1 < ∆Dh
∗
i,t and s
∗
i,t + Shi,t−1 > 0⇒

Shi,t = 0
∆Shi,t = −Shi,t−1
∆Dhi,t > 0
∆Dhi,t = s
∗
i,t + Shi,t−1
ci,t = c
∗
i,t
if s∗i,t + Shi,t−1 < 0 and s
∗
i,t + Shi,t−1 +Dhi,t−1 > 0⇒

Shi,t = 0
∆Shi,t = −Shi,t−1
∆Dhi,t < 0
∆Dhi,t = s
∗
i,t + Shi,t−1
ci,t = c
∗
i,t
if s∗i,t + Shi,t−1 +Dhi,t−1 < 0⇒

Shi,t = 0
∆Shi,t = −Shi,t−1
Dhi,t = 0
∆Dhi,t = −Dhi,t−1
ci,t ≥ c˜
ci,t = ydi,t + Shi,t−1 +Dhi,t−1
(50)
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Firms
Ct =
N∑
i=1
ci,t (51)
It = γ1
Πt−1
Yt−1
+ γ2ut−1 + γ3Zt (52)
Zt = γ4Zt−1 + U(0, 0.1) (53)
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + I (54)
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (55)
ΠF,t = Ct + It +Gt −Wt (56)
pit =
ΠF,t
Yt
(57)
Df,t = ηKt (58)
Pft = (1− τ3)ΠF,t −RLf,t (59)
∆Lft = I + ∆Df,t − Pft (60)
(61)
Stage 2 and 3
∆CPf,t = χ(I + ∆Df,t − Pft) (62)
∆Lft = I + ∆Df,t − Pft −∆CPf,t (63)
rcp = (1− µ)rft−1 + ø
CPSf,t−1 − CPDif,t−1
CPSf,t−1 + CP
D
if,t−1
(64)
Government
Tt = τ3ΠF,t +
N∑
i=1
τwj wi,t (65)
Gt = ξCt−1 (66)
GDSt = r
b
t−1GDt−1 (67)
∆GDt = Gt − Tt +GDSt (68)
GDt = GDt−1 + ∆GDt (69)
rbt = r
b
t−1[1 + α(
BB,t
GDt
− BB,t−1
GDt−1
)] (70)
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Appendix C: Parameters
Symbol Description Baseline
T Number of periods 1000
N Number of households 1000
τ1 Lower tax rate on income 0.2
τ2 Higher tax rate on income 0.4
τ3 Tax rate on profit 0.5
γ1 Profit share weight (investment function) 0.2
γ2 Capacity utilization weight (investment function) 0.01
γ3 Animal spirit weight (investment function) 0.1
γ4 Weight of the autoregressive component (investment function) 0.9
η Precautionary deposits 0.2
β Weight of CDO/Bond spread in IF portfolio allocation 10
σ Sensitivity to return on share/base rate spread (household portfolio choice) 1
φ Speed of adjustment in public bonds’ bids 0.01
ω Sensitivity to distance from desired share of bonds (banks credit rationing) 0.3
ι Sensitiveness to the debt service ratio (interest rate setting) 1
 Tolerance in recursive processes (bonds and return on share determination) 0.1
k¯ Desired share of bonds in banks’ portfolio 0.4
cy Propensity to consume out of income 0.8
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.03
λ1 Wage bill’s determination out of capital 0.15
ξ Public purchases’ determination out of capital 0.6
θ Log-standard deviation (wage distribution) 0.5
csub Subsistence consumption 0.25
cn ‘Socially determined’ consumption 0.2
Table 4: Parameter setting
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